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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

curing insurance elsewhere, refrained from so doing because of his arrangement
with the defendant, and thus died without the completed policy he had intended.
If the theory of the Restatement is correct, the result which it infers would be
plainly contrary to the present holding, and in accord with leading cases in other
jurisdictions. Stark v. Pioneer Casualty Co., - Cal. -, 34 Pac. (2nd) 731
(1934); Kukusha v. Home Mutual Hail-Tornado Ins. Co., 204 Wis. 166, 235
N.W. 403 (1931); Duffie v. Bankers Life Ass'n. Co., supra; Boyer v. Stale
Farmers Mutual Hail Ins. Co., supra.
It would seem that the court reached an erroneous result in the present case
because it neglected to consider the utility of the defendant's conduct in the light

of the risk it entailed, but instead assumed that no duty existed and attempted to
J. E. K.
justify this decision on contract rather than tort principles.

BOOK REVIEWS
Conveyancing in Pennsylvania
By

GROVER CLEVELAND LADNER

Clark Boardman Co., Ltd., New York, N.Y., 1941. Pp. xxxiv, 933.
Second and Revised Edition. Two Volumes. Price: $15.00

"There ought to be a law" requiring all book reviewers to have paid the full
retail price of any book reviewed. One does not care to "look a gift horse in the
mouth." Even though the present reviewer will not retain the presently-discussed
volumes, his school library will receive the benefit thereof, and this may blun4
somewhat, the sharpness of his pen. But an honest review of this book requires
that some of its defects be pointed out specifically and a sense of appreciation has
not stilled our tongue entirely.
A mild criticism of the work of the author is his continuation in this second
edition of his policy enunciated in the first edition, as found in its preface: "LittlL
space has been used discussing doubtful propositions of law." The author must
purport to be (and indubitably is) an expert on the law of the conveying of real
property in Pennsylvania or he would not have the temerity to publish such a work.
Being an expert, his opinions on many matters where the cases are either in confusion or are silent or are not clear in their import, would have added much to the
utility of this work. Modesty should not be permitted to interfere with making
the treatise the most valuable one possible to judges, lawyers and students. We
feel that this practice has just that effect.
The book would have profited considerably by the careful touch of a skilled
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and adequate proofreader. Entirely too many typographical errors have crept into
the volumes as printed. For example, "grantee" is used on page 130 where the
proper word intended was "mortgagee". On page 165 a paragraph printed under
the discussion of acknowledgment of deeds by the Commonwealth obviously belongs to a later discussion on the same page on acknowledgment of deeds by a
corporation. On page 364, Kirk v. Kirk, 340 Pa. 203, is cited as Kirk v. Kirk,
240 Pa. 203. Many other minor errors, such as misplaced commas and improperly
used capital ltters, mar the book considerably.
More serious by far than these errors are statements of law in various places
in the book which are either actually erroneous or give an erroneous impression.
Some only of these all too frequent errors will be cited by us. For example, on
page 376, the author states that there is only one exception to the general rule that
priority of recording determines priority of right, in the absence of notice, the
stated exception being of purchase money mortgages which have a grace period of
thirty days, unfortunately. But there are at least two other exceptions which Judge
Ladner omits. (1) Deeds executed out of the state of Pennsylvania (see 21 P.S.
445); (2) Separate written defeasances to absolute deeds where the subsequent
execution and delivery of a grant or mortgage by the purportedly absolute owner
gives priority at once without priority of recording (see 21 P.S. 951).
Again, on page 226, it is said: "A mortgage for a pre-existing debt is as effective as when given for a debt incurred at the time of the execution of the mortgage,
with the exception of the possibility of being avoided in bankruptcy as a preference . . ." This ignores entirely the definite holding in Pennsylvania that mortgages given for pre-existing debts do not make the mortgagee a purchaser for value
under the recording system so as to protect him against prior unrecorded deeds, etc.
(see Ashton's Appeal, 73 Pa. 153, 162 (1873) and 37 DICK. L. REV. 282, 286);
nor is such a mortgagee protected, as a taker of a legal title for value would be,
against prior nonrecordable equities of which he has no notice (see Kepler v.
Kepler, 330 Pa. 441, 446 (1938) ).
Also on pages 297 and 298 it is said: "Next a covenant on the part of the
grantee (of a ground rent) to pay all the taxes assessed against the property which
is important in that it relieves the grantor from paying any taxes on his ground
rent." (First italics added by us.) But this is not correct and the case cited for this
proposition does not so decide. In the cited case of Van Beil v. Brogan, 65 Pa.
Super. 384 (1917) affirmed in 262 Pa. 362 (1918) there was an agreement to
pay the taxes assessed against the yearly rent as well as against the lot and buildings. An agreement to pay the taxes assessed against the property would not include an obligation to pay the taxes assessed against the ground rent (see Robinson
v. County of Allegheny, 7 Pa. 161 (1847) ).
On page 362, Judge Ladner states: "Should the wife elope from the husband
and commit adultery her dower rights are barred", citing Lewis v. Parrott, 37
W.N.C. 330 (1895). It is to be noted that the book uses the term "dower rights"
to include the present-day so-called "statutory dower". To put it mildly, it is at

208

DICKINSON

LAW

REVIEW

least questionable whether this represents the present-day law under the Intestate
Act of 1917. This act provides that wilful and malicious desertion continued for
one year shall bar the intestate rights of the wife. In Lodge's Estate, 287 Pa. 184
(1926) there was an elopement and adultery but the court is careful to show that
the barring of dower there came about through the act of adultery making a prior
consensual separation into a wilful and malicious one and that this separation
continued for a year, thus barring her dower rights.
Again in listing the various ways in which curtesy may be barred, on page 355
et seq., the author says that a divorce from "bed and board" will not bar curtesy,
which is correct, but he fails to list a conveyance made by the wife alone after such
a divorce as one of the methods for barring curtesy although on page 55 he cites
the statute so providing (see 48 P.S. 117a and Scaife v. McKee, 298 Pa. 33 (1929)
where the act was held to be constitutional).
Other errors of somewhat similar sort might be cited but we believe that we
have mentioned sufficient ones to show that the user of these volumes will have to
read them in an inquiring and skeptical frame of mind and should not always take
Judge Ladner at his word. We feel that many of these errors and misstatements
and omissions could have been prevented readily by the spending of a little more
time in the work of revision of the first edition.
There are many good points about the work, sufficient certainly to make the
work almost a necessity in the library of a practicing attorney and to make the book
a "must" one for a law student studying the Pennsylvania law of real proyerty. The
work covers adequately all of the subjects with which it purports to deal and there.
by makes itself a thorough foundation work for those interested in real property
law of Pennsylvania. But on difficult issues or on novel ones, Judge Ladner's modrety or reticence prevents the work being of any considerable assistance.
The forms given in the book are extremely well done and cover almost all of
those needed in the law of real property so far as conveyancing is concerned. The
practice of putting many of them into the appropriate places in the text where the
subject matter is discussed has been continued and should prove helpful. The book
contains practical suggestions of considerable merit in the art of conveyancing. For
example, the suggested form for including a "use" restriction, found on page
136, is a helpful one, as are many others.
It is to be regretted that no pocket parts are provided for to keep the work upto-date for already the legislative acts of 1941 have made many changes necessary
in the text, such as the discussion of deficiency judgments.
We believe that as a crude "rule-of-thumb" the size of the index to a text
measures closely the merit of the book. So-judged, the book is A No. 1 for the
index covers 75 pages. A table of cases is included which is "of the essence" of a
good law book. It also includes a table of statutes cited, with their Purdon's citations as well.
Despite some obvious deficiencies, we do not hesitate to recommend its use by
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lawyers and students interested in the Pennsylvania law of conveyancing of real
property.
HAROLD S. IRWIN

CARLISLE, PA.

Some Legal Foundations of Society-Understanding, Purpose and Conciliation as
Means and Ends of Positive Law and Representative Government-A Short
Introduction to the Study of Law and Government with Psycbological,
Sociological and Economic Approach.
BY RuBY R. VALE, D.C.L., LL.D.
Three Volumes.

C. W. Taylor, Jr., 500 Sansome Street, San Francisco.
$4.00 per Volume.

1941.

The author needs no introduction to the legal profession, particularly in
Pennsylvania. However, his former efforts have been along lines of digesting
decisional law, whereas the present publication is an incursion into the philosophy of law and of government.
Volume I, under the general topic "Understanding," is divided into five
subheads as follows:
(1) The Cosmos
(2) The Human Mental Processes
(3) Animal Behavior and Human Action
(4) Individual Responsibility
(5) Reality and Its Categories.
Following this order there are notes appended, quite -extensive, and with General Index the Volume embraces 262 pages.
Volume II, under the general topic "Purpose," is subdivided into three
topics as follows:
(1) Social Order and Individual Liberty
(2)
Social Organizations and Human Culture
(3) Individual Interests and Social Organizations.
Volume III, under the general topic "Conciliation," is subdivided as follows:
(1) Theories of Political and Societal Development Which Stress the
Dynamic Mind
(2) The Challenges of Socialistic Collectivism.
The present review is of the first volume as the writer has not had the opportunity of examining the contents of the later volumes. In the introduction
the author sets forth the purpose and scope of his work as follows:
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"The purpose of this thesis is to give a conception of government and positive law as determined by cosmic forces in evolution and as molded to the uses
of man by his dynamic mind. This philosophy forms the background and leads
to the consideration of the challenges that now confront that dynamic mind. It
deduces the essence of law not alone from the nature of events in relation, but
as well from the nature of man himself as an animal of dynamic mental processes. It affirms the vital nexus of individual enterprise and striving to a government of laws and not of men for the security, freedom and welfare of the
group and the individual. It accepts the confidence and capacity of every mind
to master animal propensities as the fundamental of the governance of all, and
regards representative democracy as the only political organization yet devised,
under which every mind is free to think, to plan and to achieve its purposive
aspirations. It avows the equality of all before and under the law and the exclusion of none from the privileges and duties of self-government. It espouses
the underlying principle of freedom of opportunity to work and to save, to seek
and to attain place and to develop a personality. It questions the truth of all
laws as absolutes, as well as doubts the validity of all principles as universals or
as ultimates. It repudiates as witbout foundation in experience or warrant in
reason the indispensability of any class or group of men or of any man in economy or as official in government. Finally, it suggests the solution of compromise and conciliation as the only means of adjustment, and the equitable distribution of profits as the essential of those understandings of justice that follow
co-operative relations."
A reading of Volume I shows the erudition, painstaking research and profound thought of the learned author on the several topics discussed. The notes
to the text, added at the end of the book, are conveniently arranged for reference of the reader but without disturbing the continuity in reading. The substance of these notes is valuable, not only for the suggested courses of study but
likewise for the interesting and pertinent observations of the author. The admonition to compromise among contending economic schools as suggested at
page 173 is timely. Perhaps after all the eclectic school is the best to follow.
The work is recommended to the thoughtful student of law who may have
time and inclination to reflect in these troublous days and with a thought to a
future less distraught by the clash of arms. The present volume is a model of
the printer's art with excellent paper and print and most attractive binding. It
is assumed the later volumes are of like mechanics.
CHAM BERSBURG, PA.

A. J. WHMTE HUTTON

